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Abstract Single-peaked preferences have played an important role in the literature
ever since they were used by Black (J Polit Econ 56:23–34, 1948) to formulate a domain
restriction that is sufficient for the exclusion of cycles according to the majority rule.
In this paper, we approach single-peakedness from a choice-theoretic perspective. We
show that the well-known axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives (a form of
contraction consistency) and a continuity requirement characterize a class of single-
peaked choice functions. Moreover, we examine rationalizability and representability
of these choice functions.
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1 Introduction
Single-peaked preferences have played an important role in the literature ever since
they were used by Black (1948) to formulate a domain restriction that is sufficient
for the exclusion of cycles according to the majority rule; see also Inada (1969) and
Sen (1970) for early contributions that employ domain assumptions of that nature. An
example for more recent applications is the area devoted to the study of
strategy-proofness, where the single-peakedness restriction on preferences has proven
to allow for several classes of possible collective choice rules in one-dimensional pol-
icy spaces; see, for example, Moulin (1980) and Sprumont (1991). Single-peakedness
(or more specific notions such as spatial or Euclidean preferences) can be defined in
higher dimensions as well; see, for instance, Le Breton and Weymark (2007) for a
detailed discussion. They arise naturally in many economic models, e.g., by maximiz-
ing a strictly quasi-concave utility function on a linear budget set in consumer theory.
See also Barberà et al. (1993), Barberà and Jackson (1994), Ehlers and Storcken
(2002), and Dutta et al. (2002), to name but a few.
In this paper, we approach single-peakedness from a choice-theoretic perspective.
The universal set of alternatives is represented by a Euclidean space (of fixed but
arbitrary dimension), and a choice function assigns a unique alternative to each fea-
sible set within the domain of this function. We assume that the domain consists of
all non-empty, compact and convex subsets of the Euclidean space, an assumption
that is standard in the context of choice in economic environments. Nevertheless, all
our results would go through on (for instance) the restricted domain of all polytopes,
i.e., sets that are the convex hulls of finitely many points. We comment on domain
restrictions in the concluding section.
The central conditions we impose on a choice function are the well-known axiom of
independence of irrelevant alternatives, and continuity (with respect to the Hausdorff
metric on compact sets). Independence of irrelevant alternatives, IIA, is a form of
contraction consistency introduced by Nash (1950) in the context of bargaining prob-
lems; it generalizes the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference from consumer demand
theory. Indeed, our approach is based on the idea of revealed preference. We show, in
Sect. 3, that IIA and a weaker continuity condition—continuity restricted to intervals
on the same straight line—characterize a class of choice functions that we call single-
peaked. A choice function is single-peaked if its direct revealed preference relation
is antisymmetric and satisfies the following condition: if an alternative x is direct
revealed preferred to another alternative y, then it is direct revealed preferred to all
alternatives on the straight half-line from x through y. This definition implies that
such a choice function has at most one (global) peak—a point that is always chosen
when it is available. Even if there is no global peak, preference along any straight line
decreases monotonically away from a (local) peak on that line, where this peak may
also be located at ‘infinity’. If a (global) peak does not exist or cannot be chosen, then
always a boundary point of the choice set is chosen.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to the issues of rationalizability and repre-
sentability of single-peaked choice functions. In Sect. 4 we show that if the dimension
is at least 2, then for any natural number n > 2 there are choice functions with a
peak that satisfy IIA and (full) continuity, such that the associated revealed preference
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relation has cycles of length n but no shorter cycles.1 Also for choice functions without
a peak, IIA and continuity do not guarantee acyclicity of the revealed preference rela-
tion, with one exception: if the dimension is 2, then IIA and (the weaker) continuity
(condition) imply acyclicity.
In Sect. 5 we show that a continuous choice function is representable by a utility
function if the associated revealed preference relation is acyclic, and that such a utility
function must be strictly quasi-concave. These results are in line with what is known
from demand theory—for example, Debreu (1972)—about continuity of preferences
and convexity of choice sets, but they nevertheless require proofs and to the best of
our knowledge are new.
Again to the best of our knowledge, our results are original for dimension at least 2.
Of course, they are related to other work in the area of choice and demand, (revealed)
preference, and rationalizability–representability: the directly relevant sources will be
mentioned as the paper develops. Moulin (1984) examines social choice functions
defined on a domain involving single-peaked preference profiles that satisfy suitably
formulated versions of independence properties. As a by-product of his analysis he
obtains a characterization of single-peaked choice from closed intervals within [0, 1]
based on IIA and continuity (see Remark 1 in Moulin 1984). This is closely related
to our results, applied to the one-dimensional case, where every single-peaked choice
function is rationalizable and representable.
Ballester and Haeringer (2006) provide a characterization of (one-dimensional)
single-peaked preference profiles. They examine the question under what conditions
there exists a single ranking of the alternatives such that all preferences within the
profile are single-peaked with respect to this ranking. Thus, although the title of their
paper may suggest differently, their work is not closely related to our work.
The outline of the paper has been given above. Some concluding remarks are col-
lected in Sect. 6.
2 Preliminaries
We consider choices from sets of k-dimensional vectors, where k ∈ N is arbitrary
but fixed. For a non-empty set C ⊆ Rk , conv(C) denotes the convex hull of C , and
bd(C) denotes the (topological) boundary of C . If C = {x, y} for some x, y ∈ Rk , we
also write [x, y] instead of conv(C) and refer to this set as an interval. The (relatively)
open or half-open sets (x, y], [x, y), and (x, y) are defined in the obvious way. For
distinct x, y ∈ Rk , [x, y,→) denotes the half-line through y starting at x and (x, y)
denotes the straight line through x and y.
For a (binary) relation R ⊆ Rk × Rk , we use P to denote the asymmetric part of
R, that is, x Py if and only if x Ry and ¬y Rx for all x, y ∈ Rk . A relation R on Rk
is: (i) reflexive if x Rx for all x ∈ Rk ; (ii) complete if x Ry or y Rx for all x, y ∈ Rk
such that x = y; (iii) transitive if [x Ry and y Rz] implies x Rz for all x, y, z ∈ Rk ;
1 The construction of these choice functions involves some interesting classical geometry, see also the
Appendix to the paper. Moreover, so far we have not been able to find simpler choice functions to do the
work.
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(iv) antisymmetric if [x Ry and y Rx] implies x = y for all x, y ∈ Rk ; (v) acyclic if
there exist no m ∈ N\{1, 2} and x1, . . . , xm such that xi Pxi+1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m},
where xm+1 := x1.
The set of all non-empty, compact and convex subsets of Rk is denoted by C. The
convergence of a sequence in C is defined in terms of the Hausdorff metric.2
A choice function is a mapping ϕ : C → Rk such that ϕ(C) ∈ C for all C ∈ C.
So a choice function is single-valued, and it is defined for every non-empty, compact
and convex subset of C, including single points. A choice function ϕ on C induces a
relation Rϕ on Rk defined by
x Rϕ y :⇔ there exists C ∈ C such that y ∈ C and ϕ(C) = x
for all x, y ∈ Rk . The relation Rϕ is called the direct revealed preference relation
corresponding to the choice function ϕ. Due to our domain assumption (in particular,
because {x} ∈ C for all x ∈ Rk), Rϕ is reflexive. The (indirect) revealed preference
relation Rϕ corresponding to ϕ is the transitive closure of Rϕ , that is,
x Rϕ y :⇔ there are m ∈ N \ {1} and x1, . . . , xm ∈ Rk such that
x = x1, xi Rxi+1 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1} and xm = y
for all x, y ∈ Rk .
The following properties of a choice function ϕ : C → Rk are of importance in this
paper.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). For all C, D ∈ C,
C ⊆ D and ϕ(D) ∈ C ⇒ ϕ(C) = ϕ(D).
IIA is the standard contraction-independence property for single-valued choice
functions; see Nash (1950) for its application in a bargaining framework.




i = C ⇒ lim
i→∞ ϕ(C
i ) = ϕ(C).
We also use the following weaker version of continuity. In this weakening the
continuity axiom applies to intervals along the same line only.
2 The Hausdorff metric dH is defined as follows. For C, D ∈ C,












c∈C ||d − c||
}}
,
where || · || denotes the Euclidean metric.
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Collinear Interval Continuity (CIC). For all distinct x, y ∈ Rk and for all sequences
〈xi 〉i∈N and 〈yi 〉i∈N with xi , yi ∈ (x, y) for all i ∈ N,
lim
i→∞ x
i = x and lim
i→∞ y
i = y ⇒ lim
i→∞ ϕ([x
i , yi ]) = ϕ([x, y]).
If ϕ satisfies IIA, then x Rϕ y implies ¬y Rϕx for all x, y ∈ Rk such that x = y:
this is so since, under IIA, x Rϕ y is equivalent to ϕ([x, y]) = x . Thus, if ϕ satisfies
IIA, then the direct revealed preference relation Rϕ is antisymmetric.
We proceed with definitions of the well-known notions of rationalizability and
rationalizability–representability of a choice function, formulated for our specific
environment. A choice function ϕ : C → Rk is rationalizable if there exists a transi-
tive relation R on Rk such that
{ϕ(C)} = {x ∈ C | x Ry for all y ∈ C}
for all C ∈ C.3 A choice function ϕ is rationalizable–representable if there exist a
transitive relation R on Rk and a function u : Rk → R such that R rationalizes ϕ and
[x Ry ⇒ u(x) ≥ u(y)] and [x Py ⇒ u(x) > u(y)]
for all x, y ∈ Rk .
A function u : Rk → R is strictly quasi-concave if for all z, z′ ∈ Rk with z = z′
and all 0 < α < 1, u(αz + (1 − α)z′) > min{u(z), u(z′)}.
3 Single-peaked choice functions
The objective of this paper is to study choice functions that satisfy IIA and continu-
ity (CON). We will show that such choice functions are single-peaked in the sense
described by the following definition.
Definition 3.1 A choice function ϕ : C → Rk is single-peaked if
(i) Rϕ is antisymmetric;
(ii) for all x, y ∈ Rk with x = y,
x Rϕ y ⇒ x Rϕz for all z ∈ [x, y,→).
Thus, a choice function is single-peaked if (i) the direct revealed preference relation
is antisymmetric and (ii) for all distinct x and y, if x is directly revealed preferred to
y then x is directly revealed preferred to any point on the straight half-line through y
emanating from x .
Note that the definition of single-peakedness implies the following. If x is directly
revealed preferred to y = x , then for any two points z = z′ on the straight half-line
3 Requiring the rationalizing relation to be reflexive, complete and transitive leads to an equivalent formu-
lation of rationalizability; see Richter (1966, 1971).
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emanating from x through y, if z is closer to x than z′ is, then z is directly revealed
preferred to z′. This follows from the fact that ϕ([z, z′]) = z, since otherwise we
would have ϕ([z, z′])Rϕz, hence ϕ([z, z′])Rϕx by applying (ii) in the definition of
single-peakedness, a contradiction.
For later reference we formulate this observation as a proposition.
Proposition 3.2 Let ϕ : C → Rk be a single-peaked choice function. If x = y and
x Rϕ y, then z Rϕz′ for all z′ ∈ [x, y,→) and z ∈ [x, z′].
The expression ‘single-peaked’ is motivated by the following observation. Let the
choice function ϕ be single-peaked and suppose that there is a C ∈ C such that
p := ϕ(C) is an interior point of C . Since, for any point x ∈ Rk , the half-line [p, x,→)
contains a point of C distinct from p, single-peakedness implies that pPϕx . Hence,
p is directly revealed strictly preferred to every x ∈ Rk . This implies ϕ(D) = p for
every D ∈ C with p ∈ D. Moreover, for every other D ∈ C, ϕ(D) must be a boundary
point. Summarizing, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 Let ϕ : C → Rk be a single-peaked choice function. Then either (i)
or (i i) holds, where:
(i) There is a p ∈ Rk such that for all C ∈ C, ϕ(C) = p if p ∈ C and ϕ(C) ∈ bd(C)
if p /∈ C.
(ii) ϕ(C) ∈ bd(C) for all C ∈ C.
If case (i) applies in Proposition 3.3, the point p is called a peak of ϕ. Clearly, if a
single-peaked choice function has no peak in the sense of (i), then nevertheless it still
induces a ‘local’ peak (possibly at ‘infinity’) on each straight line.
For k = 1, this definition reduces to rationalizability by single-peaked preferences: if
there is a peak p ∈ R, define the relation R by letting
x Ry :⇔ |x − p| ≤ |y − p|
for all x, y ∈ R; if there is no peak, let either
x Ry :⇔ x ≤ y
for all x, y ∈ R or
x Ry :⇔ x ≥ y
for all x, y ∈ R, whichever case applies. Moreover, rationalizability–representability
is guaranteed: for the three possibilities illustrated above, the corresponding utility
function u : R → R can be defined by
u(x) = −|x − p|




for all x ∈ R or
u(x) = x
for all x ∈ R, respectively.4
Single-peaked choice functions are characterized by IIA and CIC, as established in
the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4 Let k ∈ N. A choice function ϕ : C → Rk satisfies IIA and CIC if and
only if ϕ is single-peaked.
Proof ‘If.’ Suppose ϕ is single-peaked.
To establish IIA, suppose that C, D ∈ C with C ⊆ D and ϕ(D) ∈ C . If ϕ(C) =
ϕ(D), then by definition of Rϕ , both ϕ(C)Rϕϕ(D) and ϕ(D)Rϕϕ(C), a contradiction
with part (i), antisymmetry of Rϕ . Hence, ϕ(C) = ϕ(D) and IIA holds.
To prove that CIC is satisfied, let x, y be distinct elements of Rk and consider
sequences 〈xi 〉i∈N and 〈yi 〉i∈N with xi , yi ∈ (x, y) for all i ∈ N, and with
limi→∞ xi = x and limi→∞ yi = y. It is sufficient to show that any convergent
subsequence of (ϕ([xi , yi ]))i∈N has limit ϕ([x, y]). Without loss of generality sup-
pose limi→∞ ϕ([xi , yi ]) exists. To the contrary, suppose that v := ϕ([x, y]) =
limi→∞ ϕ([xi , yi ]) =: w ∈ [x, y]. Then vRϕw, (without loss of generality)
ϕ([xi , yi ]) = v for all i , and by part (ii) of single-peakedness, vRϕϕ([xi , yi ]) for
all i . If w ∈ (x, y) then we can choose i such that ϕ([xi , yi ]) ∈ (xi , yi ), so that
ϕ([xi , yi ])Rϕxi and ϕ([xi , yi ])Rϕ yi , and hence by (ii), we obtain ϕ([xi , yi ])Rϕv, a
contradiction with antisymmetry of Rϕ . If w /∈ (x, y) then without loss of generality
w = y; then v ∈ [x, y) and we can choose i such that ϕ([xi , yi ]) ∈ (v, yi ], so that
ϕ([xi , yi ])Rϕv by (ii), again a contradiction with antisymmetry. This completes the
proof of CIC of ϕ.
‘Only if.’ Suppose ϕ satisfies IIA and CIC.
As remarked earlier, antisymmetry of Rϕ follows from IIA. To prove part (ii)
of single-peakedness, let x, y be distinct elements of Rk with x Rϕ y and let z ∈
[x, y,→). Assume, contrary to what we wish to prove, ¬ x Rϕz. Let v := ϕ([x, z]),
then v = x and by IIA, ϕ([x, v]) = v. Also by IIA, ϕ([x, y]) = x . Hence, again
by IIA, v ∈ [x, y,→) \ [x, y], and for all w ∈ [v, y], either ϕ([x, w]) = x or
ϕ([x, w]) ∈ (y, w]. Let wβ := (1 − β)y + βv for every 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and β∗ :=
inf{0 ≤ β ≤ 1 | ϕ([x, wβ ]) ∈ [y, wβ ]}. (The infimum exists since ϕ([x, v]) = v.)
Then ϕ([x, wβ ]) = x for all 0 ≤ β < β∗, so by CIC, ϕ([x, wβ∗ ]) = x . But again by
CIC, ϕ([x, wβ∗ ]) ∈ [y, β∗], a contradiction. This completes the proof of part (ii) and
of the theorem. unionsq
Single-peaked choice functions do not necessarily satisfy full continuity, CON. For
instance, the single-peaked choice function picking the lexicographic maximum of a
choice set in R2 does not satisfy CON (cf. also Example 5.1). In other words, the class
of all IIA and CON choice functions is a proper subclass of the class of single-peaked
choice functions.
4 As mentioned in the Introduction, a similar result was derived in Moulin (1984) for choice functions
defined on subsets of a closed interval. See in particular his Remark 1.
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4 Rationalizability
If k = 1, single-peaked choice functions are rationalizable, as mentioned earlier. Thus,
IIA and CIC (which is equivalent to CON in this case) together guarantee rational-
izability. However, matters are more complex in higher dimensions, also under (IIA
and) CON.
Suppose k ≥ 2. As noted before, IIA implies that Rϕ is antisymmetric and, thus,
there are no cycles of length two in Rϕ . Conversely, the absence of cycles of length
two in Rϕ implies IIA. Thus, these two conditions are equivalent. Although necessary,
IIA (or, equivalently, the absence of cycles of length two) is not sufficient for ration-
alizability unless specific domain assumptions are made. What is sufficient on any
domain is the strong axiom of revealed preference which, in our setting, is equivalent
to the requirement that the revealed preference relation Rϕ be acyclic (or, equivalently,
that the revealed preference relation Rϕ be antisymmetric). This raises the question
whether IIA, possibly together with CIC or CON, is sufficient to rule out cycles of
arbitrary length on our domain, thus guaranteeing rationalizability. More generally,
we investigate whether ruling out cycles of length n ∈ N or less is sufficient to rule
out longer cycles for arbitrary n ≥ 2. In answering this question, it turns out that we
have to distinguish between the two possibilities (i) and (ii) in Proposition 3.3.
4.1 Choice functions with a peak
In the following example we show that, for any n ∈ N with n ≥ 2, there is a choice
function with a peak (in the example the point 0), satisfying IIA and CON, such that
there are no cycles of length n (or smaller) but there are cycles of length n+1 (or larger).
This implies that, without further assumptions, there is no n such that the exclusion of
cycles of length n implies the exclusion of all cycles, for a choice function satisfying
IIA and CON.
Example 4.1 Let k = 2. Let α ∈ [0, π/2]. We are going to construct a choice function
ϕα . For C ∈ C with 0 ∈ C let ϕα(C) := 0. Now let C ∈ C with 0 /∈ C .
For every β ∈ [0, 2π) let β be the half-line starting from the origin and forming
an angle of β radians with the positive horizontal axis. Then the set B(C) := {β ∈
[0, 2π) | β ∩ C = ∅} is either of the form [β1, β2] with 0 ≤ β1 ≤ β2 < 2π
or of the form [β1, 2π) ∪ [0, β2] with 0 ≤ β2 < β1 < 2π . For every β ∈ B(C)
let xβ be the point in C ∩ β closest to the origin. We define the correspondence
c : B(C) → [0, π/2] as follows: for every β ∈ B(C), c(β) is the interval of the
non-obtuse angles (in radians) between β and those supporting lines of the set C at
the point xβ that (weakly) separate C from the origin. Then 0 ∈ c(β1) and 0 ∈ c(β2).
There is a unique value of β with π/2 ∈ c(β), namely the value of β such that xβ
is the point of C with minimal Euclidean distance to the origin. The correspondence
c strictly increases from β1 to this value, and then strictly decreases again to β2. In
particular, there are at most two different values of β such that α ∈ c(β). Let these
values be β ′ and β ′′ such that β ′ mod β1 ≤ β ′′ mod β1, then ϕα(C) := xβ ′ .
In other words, if C contains the origin then ϕα chooses the origin. Otherwise, ϕα
chooses a point from the boundary of C such that there is a supporting line of C at
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Fig. 1 Illustration of the set of choice functions defined in Example 4.1. The choice set is the shaded set
C , and x = ϕπ/2(C), y = ϕα(C) for some value α between 0 and π/2, and z = ϕ0(C)
this point that forms an angle of α radians with the line through this point and the
origin. The chosen point is always the point on the latter line closest to the origin, and
in case there are two such points, on different lines through the origin, then ϕα takes
the first one going counter clockwise. For instance, for α = π/2, ϕα(C) is the point
of C closest to the origin. For α = 0, it takes the point of C closest to the origin on the
first supporting line of C passing through the origin when going counter clockwise.
See Fig. 1.
For every α ∈ [0, π/2], the choice function ϕα is well-defined and satisfies IIA.
For every α ∈ (0, π/2], ϕα satisfies CON, but for α = 0 it does not. unionsq
We will prove a theorem which implies our earlier claim: that, for every n ≥ 2, there is
a choice function satisfying IIA and CON which has no cycles of length n or smaller,
but which has cycles of length n + 1 or larger. In the proof, we make use of the
following result which is proven in the Appendix. For every n ∈ N with n ≥ 2, define
A(n) = n − 2
2n
π.
The number A(n) is equal to half the angle at a vertex in a regular n-polygon.
For distinct x, y, z ∈ R2 we denote by xyz ∈ [0, π ] the size (in radians) of the
angle formed between the straight line through x and y and the straight line through
z and y.
Theorem 4.2 Let k = 2, let P be a convex n-polygon with vertices x1, . . . , xn and
let xˆ be a point of P such that xˆ x1x2 = xˆ x2x3 = · · · = xˆ xn−1xn =: α < π/2
and xˆ xn x1 ≥ α. Then α ≤ A(n).
The main result of this subsection is the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3 Let k = 2, let α ∈ (0, π/2) and let n ∈ N \ {1} be such that A(n) <
α ≤ A(n + 1). Then Rϕα has no cycle of length n but it does have a cycle of length
n + 1.
123
222 W. Bossert, H. Peters
(i) (ii)
Fig. 2 Illustrations for the proof of Theorem 4.3
Proof We first exhibit an (n+1)-cycle for Rϕα , and then show that there are no smaller
cycles.
To exhibit an (n + 1)-cycle, take a regular (n + 1)-polygon with 0 as center. Let
x1, . . . , xn+1 be the successive vertices of this polygon. Since 0x1x2 = A(n+1)≥α,
it follows that ϕα([x1, x2]) = x1 by definition of ϕα , hence x1 Rϕα x2. This argument
can be repeated for any successive pair of vertices, so that x1 Rϕα x2 Rϕα . . . Rϕα xn+1
Rϕα x1. So Rϕα has an (n + 1)-cycle.
Next, we show that there are no smaller cycles. It is sufficient to show that there
are no cycles of length n. Suppose, to the contrary, that there is such a cycle
x1 Rϕα x2 Rϕα . . . Rϕα xn Rϕα x1.
Obviously, 0 is not an element of this cycle since it is the peak of ϕα . Furthermore,
we may assume that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, xi Rϕα x j implies that either i < n and
j = i + 1 or i = n and j = n + 1 since otherwise we would have an even shorter
cycle with . . . Rϕα xi Rϕα x j Rϕα . . . by leaving out the points between xi and x j in the
original cycle.
Consider x1 and x2. Since x1 Rϕα x2, x2 is a point separated from 0 by the line 1
passing through x1 and forming an angle of α radians with the line through 0 and x1.
Suppose x2 is not on 1. Since x3 must be on the same side of 1 as 0, we can replace
x2 by the unique point x ′ in [x2, x3] ∩ 1 and still have x1 Rϕα x ′Rϕα x3. Hence, we
can without loss of generality assume that x2 is on 1. There are two cases to consider,
namely (i) 0x1x2 = α; and (ii) 0x1x2 = π − α.
Case (i): Assume 0x1x2 = α and now consider x2 and x3. By repeating the
argument of the previous paragraph, we may assume that x3 is a point on the line 2
passing through x2 and forming an angle of α radians with the line through 0 and
x2. We must have 0x2x3 = α, since 0x2x3 = π − α would imply that x3 would




Repeating this argument up to and including the pair xn−1 and xn , we have n−1 lines
1, . . . , n−1, with, for each i = 1, . . . , n−1, i passing through xi and xi+1 and such
that each x j ( j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i, i + 1}) and 0 are on the same side of i but not on i .
Moreover, 0xi xi+1 = α for each i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Hence, P := conv{x1, . . . , xn}
is a convex n-polygon with vertices x1, . . . , xn , containing 0 as an interior point, such
that 0xi xi+1 = α for each i = 1, . . . , n − 1 and 0xn x1 ≥ α. The last inequal-
ity follows since xn Rϕα x1. (Observe that we cannot assume equality here: this might
involve having to replace x1 by a different point x ′ but then 0x ′x2 > α.) By applying
Theorem 4.2 to P , it follows that α ≤ A(n), a contradiction.
Case (ii): Assume 0x1x2 = π − α; see Fig. 2 (ii). Since α < π/2, this implies
||x2|| > ||x1|| (where || · || denotes the Euclidean norm). Since also 0x2x3 ≥ π −α
(otherwise we would have x1 Rϕα x3, a contradiction), we have ||x3|| > ||x2||. Contin-
uing this argument, we obtain ||x1|| < ||x2|| < · · · < ||xn|| < ||x1||. This contradic-
tion takes care of case (ii) and completes the proof of the theorem. unionsq
Intuitively it is clear that acyclicity of the revealed preference relation is even harder
to obtain for higher dimensions. One way to extend Example 4.1 and Theorem 4.3 to
k > 2 may be to ‘embed’ the choice function ϕα in higher dimensions, similar to the
construction in Peters and Wakker (1994).
4.2 Choice functions without a peak
If ϕ is a choice function such that ϕ(C) is on the boundary of C for every feasible set C ,
as in case (ii) in Proposition 3.3, the situation is different. The first observation is that,
in this case, cycles of length three cannot occur if k = 2. Moreover, this observation
is a consequence of IIA alone—no continuity requirement is needed.
Lemma 4.4 Let k = 2. If a choice function ϕ : C → Rk satisfies IIA and ϕ(C) ∈
bd(C) for all C ∈ C, then Rϕ has no cycles of length three.
Proof Suppose, to the contrary, that x1, x2, x3 ∈ R2 are three different points and
x1 Rϕx2 Rϕx3 Rϕx1. If these three points are not on the same line, then ϕ(conv({x1, x2,
x3})) must be a point on the boundary, i.e., in [x1, x2] or in [x2, x3] or in [x3, x1]. In
the first case, ϕ(conv({x1, x2, x3})) = x1 by IIA, but then x1 Rϕx3, a contradiction.
The other two cases lead to similar contradictions. If the three points are on the same
line then an analogous argument applies. unionsq
The following theorem shows that adding CIC allows us to extend this result to cycles
of arbitrary length.
Theorem 4.5 Let k = 2. If a choice function ϕ : C → Rk satisfies IIA and CIC and
ϕ(C) ∈ bd(C) for all C ∈ C, then Rϕ is acyclic.
Proof The proof proceeds by induction on the cycle length. By IIA, there are no cycles
of length two and by Lemma 4.4 there are no cycles of length three. Let m ≥ 4 and
assume as induction hypothesis that there are no cycles of length smaller than m. Sup-
pose that x1, . . . , xm are m different points such that x1 Rϕx2 Rϕ . . . Rϕxm Rϕx1. Let C
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Fig. 3 The four cases in the proof of Theorem 4.5
be the convex hull of these m points, and let x := ϕ(C). Then x ∈ bd(C), and by IIA,
there are xi and xk with i, k ∈ {1, . . . , m} and k /∈ {(i − 1) mod m, i, (i + 1) mod m}
such that x ∈ (xi , xk) and (xi , xk) ∩ {x1, . . . , xm} = ∅. We now consider four cases
concerning the location of xi+1. (For simplicity of notation we write i + 1 and i − 1
instead of (i + 1) mod m and (i − 1) mod m.) See Fig. 3, where these four cases are
illustrated.
Case (i): xi+1 is a point on the line through xi and xk . In this case xi+1 ∈ [x, xi ,→),
and in particular xi ∈ [x, xi+1], since otherwise xk Rϕxi+1 by Theorem 3.4, a contra-
diction. Then for every point y ∈ [xi−1, xi+1]∪[xi+1, xi ]we have [x, y]∩[xi−1, xi ] =
∅, hence, by Theorem 3.4, if yˆ is the point of intersection then yˆ Rϕ y. This implies
that ϕ(conv({xi−1, xi , xi+1})) must be a point of [xi−1, xi ], and hence, by IIA,
ϕ(conv({xi−1, xi , xi+1})) = xi−1. This, however, implies xi−1 Rϕxi+1, so that we
obtain a cycle of length (m − 1) by dropping the point xi from the original cycle of
length m. This contradicts the induction hypothesis.
Case (ii): xi+1 is not a point on the line through xi and xk , and the half-line
[xi , xi+1,→) is in the convex hull of the half-lines [xi , x,→) and [xi , xi−1,→).
(Observe that xi /∈ [x, xi−1] since otherwise xi Rϕxi−1 by Theorem 3.4, a contradic-
tion.) In this case, consider a half-line  starting from x and intersecting the segments
[x, xi+1] and [x, xi−1] in points z and z′, respectively. Then z Rϕz′ by Theorem 3.4,
z′Rϕxi by Theorem 3.4 since xi−1 Rϕxi , and xi Rϕz by Theorem 3.4 since xi Rϕxi+1.
Hence, we have a cycle of length three, which is a contradiction to Lemma 4.4.
Case (iii): xi+1 is not a point on the line through xi and xk , and the half-line
[xi , xi−1,→) is in the convex hull of the half-lines [xi , x,→) and [xi , xi+1,→);
and xi+1 is separated from xk by the line through x and xi−1. (Observe that xi−1 /∈
[x, xk,→) since otherwise xi−1 Rϕxk by Theorem 3.4, a contradiction.) The proof for
this case is identical to the proof of case (i).
Case (iv): xi+1 is not a point on the line through xi and xk , and the half-line
[xi , xi−1,→) is in the convex hull of the half-lines [xi , x,→) and [xi , xi+1,→);
and xi+1 and xk are on the same side of the line through x and xi−1. To deal
with this case, let v be the point of intersection of [xi , xi+1] and [x, xi−1,→).
By Theorem 3.4, vRϕxi+1. Consider the point xi−2 (recall that m ≥ 4). Since
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for any point y ∈ [xi−1, v] ∪ [v, xi−2] the line segment [x, y] intersects the line
segment [xi−2, xi−1] in some point yˆ, Theorem 3.4 implies yˆ Rϕ y for any such
point y. Hence ϕ(conv({xi−2, xi−1, v})) ∈ [xi−2, xi−1], and therefore IIA implies
ϕ(conv({xi−2, xi−1, v})) = xi−2. We now have . . . Rϕxi−2 RϕvRϕxi+1 Rϕ . . ., hence
a cycle of length m − 1. This contradiction takes care of case (iv) and completes the
proof of the proposition. unionsq
Unfortunately, Theorem 4.5 does not extend to higher dimensions. This can be shown
by a modification of the extension of an example of Gale (1960) for consumer theory
in Peters and Wakker (1991); see also Bossert (1994). Peters and Wakker (1991) con-
sider, for k = 3, the subset  ⊆ C, consisting of all elements of C ∈ C that satisfy (i)
x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ C ; (ii) y ∈ C for all x, y ∈ R3 with x ∈ C and 0 ≤ y ≤ x ; and (iii)
x > 0 for all x ∈ PO(C). Here, PO(C) := {x ∈ C | ∀y ∈ C, y ≥ x ⇒ y = x} is the
Pareto optimal subset of C .5 Then a choice function ϕ :  → R3 is constructed that
satisfies IIA and is continuous (and Pareto optimal), but admits a cycle of length four.
It can be verified that this construction is invariant under a translation over a vector
with equal coordinates. More precisely, let 1 := (1, 1, 1) ∈ R3. Then, for any sets
C, C ′ ∈  such that there is a number α ∈ R with PO(C) = {x + α1 | x ∈ PO(C ′)},
it holds that ϕ(C) = ϕ(C ′) + α1. Therefore, ϕ can be extended to all of C while
preserving IIA and CON as follows. For any set C ′ ∈ C, take a number α ∈ R such
that C := {x + α1 | x ∈ C ′} satisfies (i) and (iii) above, and extend this set C to
a set Cˆ := {x ∈ R3 | ∃y ∈ C such that 0 ≤ x ≤ y}. Then Cˆ ∈ . Now define
ϕ(C ′) := ϕ(Cˆ) − α1.
5 Representability
As mentioned earlier, the one-dimensional case is special because rationalizability–
representability is guaranteed; see the discussion in Sect. 3. Furthermore, the previ-
ous section has established that, in higher dimensions, IIA is, in general, not suffi-
cient for rationalizability even in the presence of CON. Therefore, in order to obtain
rationalizability–representability, we strengthen IIA to the acyclicity of Rϕ—that is,
the strong axiom of revealed preference. In this case, Rϕ (or any of its extensions; see
Szpilrajn 1930; Richter 1966) can be used as a rationalization.
The continuity property CIC is not sufficient to guarantee the rationalizability–
representability of ϕ if added to the acyclicity of Rϕ . This is established in the follow-
ing example.
Example 5.1 Let k = 2 and define the relation R on R2 by
x Ry :⇔ [|x1| < |y1|] or [|x1| = |y1| and |x2| ≤ |y2|]
for all x, y ∈ R2. This is a single-peaked choice function with peak p = 0. Now let, for
all C ∈ C, ϕ(C) be the unique best element in C according to R. This choice function
is well-defined because C is non-empty, compact and convex. Thus, ϕ is rationalizable
5 Of course, in our context Pareto optimality has no special appeal.
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and Rϕ is equal to R and therefore acyclic (which, of course, also implies IIA). CIC
is satisfied but CON is not. Because of the lexicographic nature of this example, ϕ is
not rationalizable–representable. unionsq
To obtain a representation theorem, we assume below that Rϕ is acyclic and ϕ satisfies
CON. We first establish two preliminary results. For x ∈ Rk and ε > 0, we use B(x, ε)
to denote the open ε-ball around x , that is, the set of points in Rk that have Euclidean
distance smaller than ε to x .
Lemma 5.2 Let k ≥ 2, let x, z ∈ Rk be such that x = z and z Rϕx and let y ∈
[z, x,→) \ [z, x]. If choice function ϕ : C → Rk satisfies IIA and CON, then there
is an ε > 0 such that x Rϕv for all v ∈ B(y, ε).
Proof By CON, there is a δ > 0 such that ϕ([w, x]) ∈ [w, x) for all w ∈ B(z, δ). By
Theorem 3.4, x Rϕv for all w ∈ B(z, δ) and v ∈ [w, x,→) \ [w, x]. We can choose
ε > 0 sufficiently small so that, for each v ∈ B(y, ε), there is a w ∈ B(z, δ) such that
v ∈ [w, x,→) \ [w, x]. Then x Rϕv for all v ∈ B(y, ε). unionsq
Lemma 5.3 Let k ≥ 2 and let x, w ∈ Rk be such that x = w and x Rϕw. If choice
function ϕ : C → Rk satisfies IIA and CON, then there is an a ∈ Qk \ {x, w} such that
x Rϕa Rϕw.
Proof By CON, there is a δ > 0 such that ||ϕ([v,w]) − x || < ||x − w||/3 for all
v ∈ B(x, δ).
If there is no z ∈ Rk\{x} with z Rϕx , then x is a peak of ϕ and we choose y ∈ B(x, δ)
arbitrarily. Otherwise, let z ∈ Rk \ {x} with z Rϕx and choose y ∈ B(x, δ)∩[z, x,→)
\ [z, x]. By Lemma 5.2, we can choose ε > 0 such that B(y, ε) ⊆ B(x, δ) and x Rϕv
for all v ∈ B(y, ε). Since the set {[v,w] ∈ Rk | v ∈ B(y, ε)} has full dimension, we
can take a v¯ ∈ B(y, ε) such that [v¯, w] contains a point a ∈ Qk \ {w} with ||a −w|| <
||x − w||/3. Since ||ϕ([v¯, w]) − x || < ||x − w||/3 and ||a − w|| < ||x − w||/3,
Theorem 3.4 implies ϕ([v¯, w])Rϕa and a Rϕw. Since v¯ ∈ B(x, δ), x Rϕϕ([v¯, w]). So
x Rϕa Rϕw. unionsq
We now obtain our representation result.
Theorem 5.4 Let k ≥ 2. If a choice function ϕ : C → Rk satisfies CON and is such
that Rϕ is acyclic, then ϕ is rationalizable–representable.
Proof The acyclicity of Rϕ implies that ϕ is rationalizable and Rϕ is a rationalization
of ϕ. We complete the proof by establishing the existence of a representation u of Rϕ .
Lemma 5.3 straightforwardly implies
x = y and x Rϕ y ⇒ there exists an a ∈ Qk \ {x, y} such that x Rϕa Rϕ y
(1)
for all x, y ∈ Rk . Let Qk = {a1, a2, . . .} be an enumeration of the (countable) set Qk .
Define u : Rk → R by
u(x) =
∑




for all x ∈ Rk . By (1) and the antisymmetry and transitivity of Rϕ , u represents Rϕ .6
unionsq
The reason why CIC is sufficient for a representation result in the one-dimensional
case but not for higher dimensions is quite intuitive. In the one-dimensional case,
variations along a straight line are sufficient to span a full-dimensional neighborhood
of a point but, of course, this is not the case in higher dimensions.
A property that is often associated with generalizations of single-peaked prefer-
ences to higher dimensions is strict quasi-concavity. Our final result establishes that if
a representation of Rϕ exists and CIC is satisfied, then this function is strictly quasi-
concave.
Theorem 5.5 Let k ≥ 2. If a choice function ϕ : C → Rk satisfies CIC and a function
u : Rk → R represents Rϕ , then u is strictly quasi-concave.
Proof First note that ϕ satisfies IIA, and thus, by Theorem 3.4, is single-peaked. Let
z, z′ ∈ Rk , let 0 < α < 1 and z′′ := αz + (1−α)z′. Let y = ϕ([z, z′]), then y Rϕz and
y Rϕz′. Since ϕ is single-peaked, Proposition 3.2 implies z′′Rϕz or z′′Rϕz′. Moreover,
since Rϕ is antisymmetric, this implies u(z′′) > min{u(z), u(z′)}. This proves strict
quasi-concavity of u. unionsq
6 Concluding remarks
Single-peaked preferences play an important role in the economics and political-
science literatures. In this paper, we have examined single-peakedness from a choice-
theoretic perspective, thus providing additional perspectives on the foundations of this
notion. In particular, we have characterized a class of single-peaked choice functions
by contraction consistency (IIA) and (collinear) continuity. For this class—under col-
linear or full continuity—we have obtained detailed results on rationalizability and
representability. Both continuity and IIA are generally accepted conditions. IIA gen-
eralizes the classical weak axiom of revealed preference and, therefore, captures the
rationality of the decision maker. Thus, our results give strong support to single-peaked
choice.
We have assumed the domain of all non-empty compact convex sets in this paper,
but it is not difficult to check, by going over the proofs, that all our results would hold
on some smaller domains as well, e.g., the domain of all polytopes. Most of our results
even go through on the minimal domain of line segments, i.e., convex hulls of two
points. Only for the positive results on rationalizability in Lemma 4.4 and Theorem 4.5
this is not clear, since their proofs use sets that are the convex hulls of more than two
points.
6 This argument, using (1), is a variation on Lemma II in Debreu (1954) for partial orders. See also Jaffray
(1975).
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4.2
Let n ∈ N with n ≥ 3 and consider a convex n-polygon P in R2 with consecutive
vertices x1, . . . , xn . This means that P is the convex hull of {x1, . . . , xn}, every xi
is an extreme point, and the boundary is the union of the line segments [xi , xi+1]
for i = 1, . . . , n with xn+1 := x1. A point xˆ ∈ P is called a Brocard point7 if
xˆ x1x2 = xˆ x2x3 = · · · = xˆ xn−1xn = xˆ xn x1. Denote this common angle size
by αxˆ .
Denote by O(C) the area of a set C in R2. For points x, y, z ∈ R2 denote by
(xyz) the triangle with vertices x , y, and z. Recall that A(n) = n−22n π is equal to
(1/2)x1x2x3 if P is a regular polygon.
Theorem 1 Let xˆ be a Brocard point in P with common angle size αxˆ . Then
(i) cot αxˆ =
(∑n
i=1 ||xi+1 − xi ||2
)
/4 O(P);
(ii) αxˆ ≤ A(n).
Proof For any triangle (xyz) we have the familiar formula O((xyz)) = (1/2)||y−
x || · ||z − x || sin yxz. Hence,
O(P) = O((xˆ x1x2)) + O((xˆ x2x3)) + · · · + O((xˆ xn x1))
= (1/2)||x1 − xˆ || · ||x2 − x1|| sin xˆ x1x2
+(1/2)||x2 − xˆ || · ||x3 − x2|| sin xˆ x2x3
+ · · · + (1/2)||xn − xˆ || · ||x1 − xn|| sin xˆ x1x2
= (1/2) sin αxˆ
[
||x1 − xˆ || · ||x2 − x1|| + ||x2 − xˆ || · ||x3 − x2||
+ · · · + ||xn − xˆ || · ||x1 − xn||
]
hence
sin αxˆ = 2 O(P)∑n
i=1 ||xi − xˆ || · ||xi+1 − xi ||
. (2)
For any triangle (xyz) we moreover have the familiar formula
cos yxz = ||y − x ||
2 + ||z − x ||2 − ||y − z||2
2||y − x || · ||z − x || .
Hence
cos αxˆ = ||x
i+1 − xi ||2 + ||xˆ − xi ||2 − ||xi+1 − xˆ ||2
2||xi+1 − xi || · ||xˆ − xi ||
7 See Honsberger (1995) or Weisstein (2005).
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for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By adding these expressions for all i = 1, . . . , n, we obtain
cos αxˆ =
∑n
i=1 ||xi+1 − xi ||2
2
∑n
i=1 ||xi − xˆ || · ||xi+1 − xi ||
. (3)
Combining (2) and (3), we obtain










For (ii), note that αxˆ is maximal if its cotangent value is minimal. Among polygons
of fixed circumference, a regular n-polygon minimizes the sum of the squares of the
edges (since this sum-function is convex) and maximizes the area.8 Hence, by (i), αxˆ
is maximal for a regular n-polygon. This implies (ii). unionsq
We now prove Theorem 4.2, which is a slight extension of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 4.2 Consider the half-line  = [x2, x1,→) through x1 starting
from x2 and the half-line ′ = [xn−1, xn,→) through xn starting from xn−1.
If  and ′ do not intersect, then we can find a point z /∈ P on ′ sufficiently far
from xn such that xˆ zx1 < α. Since xˆ xn x1 ≥ α, by a continuity consideration
there must be a point y ∈ [xn, z] such that xˆ yx1 = α. Then xˆ is a Brocard point in
the convex n-polygon with vertices x1, . . . , xn−1, y with αxˆ = α. By Theorem A(ii),
α ≤ A(n).
If  and ′ intersect, say in some point z, then it is easy to see that xˆ zx1 < α. The
argument continues as in the first case. unionsq
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